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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

NO. 4765 1-2019

)
)

V.

Gooding County Case No. CR24-19-397

)
)

DANIEL CRUZ ORTIZ,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)
)

Has Daniel Cruz Ortiz
sentencing discretion

when

(hereinafter “Cruz”) failed to

it

show

that the district court

abused

its

imposed concurrent sentences of eight years with four years

determinate upon his convictions for vehicular manslaughter and aggravated

DUI?

ARGUMENT
Cruz Has Failed To Show That The
A.

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Driving with a breath alcohol content of .085 0r higher, Cruz

hit

another car and killed

pregnant Jessie Otton, killed Otton’s unborn child, and severally injured Otton’s

(PSI, pp. 4-6; R., p. 13.)

0n

Cruz looked

into Otton’s car after the accident,

and then ﬂed

(PSI, pp. 4-5.)

foot.

The

charged Cruz With two counts 0f vehicular manslaughter, aggravated DUI, and

state

leaving the scene of an injury accident. (R., pp. 5 1-52.) Pursuant to a plea agreement Cruz pled

one count 0f vehicular manslaughter and one count 0f aggravated DUI, and the

guilty to

dismissed the other charges. (R., pp. 68-82; 9/10/19

The

district court

each conviction.
appeal.

Tr., p. 6, L.

1

— p.

state

21, L. 13.)

imposed concurrent sentences of eight years with four years ﬁxed on
12/10/19 T11, p. 24, L. 7 — p. 25, L. 14.) Cruz ﬁled a timely

(R., pp. 123-26;

On

(R., pp. 135-37.)

appeal he contends the sentence was excessive because 0f his

remorse, his offer to pay child support, his service in the National Guard, his employment, his low

LSI score
2-5.)

The

for re-offense,

that the

harm he caused was not

intentional.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.

record, however, supports the district court’s exercise 0f sentencing discretion.

Standard

B.

and

Of Review

The length 0f a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

It is

presumed

50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State
that the

is

a sentence

is

V.

will be the defendant’s

Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).

Within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that

it

a clear abuse 0f discretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing

State V. Lundguist, 134 Idaho 83

its

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

probable term of conﬁnement. Li. (citing State

Where

V.

1,

11

P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating Whether a lower court abused

discretion, the appellate court conducts a four—part inquiry,

(1) correctly perceived the issue as

one 0f discretion;

Which asks “Whether the

(2) acted within the outer

trial court:

boundaries of its

discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices

available t0

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by the

exercise of reason.” State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho

261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg

v.

My Fun Life,

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421

P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

Cruz Has Shown

C.

T0 bear
that,

No Abuse Of The

District Court’s Discretion

the burden of demonstrating an abuse 0f discretion, the appellant

under any reasonable View 0f the

facts, the

was

sentence

excessive.

must

State V. Farwell, 144

Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met

this

the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision t0 release the defendant

is

establish

burden,

on parole

exclusively the province 0f the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion Will be

the period ofactual incarceration. State V. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)

144 Idaho

(citing Oliver,

the appellant

at

726, 170 P.3d at 391).

must demonstrate

that reasonable

T0

establish that the sentence

was

excessive,

minds could not conclude the sentence was

appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,

and retribution.

Far_well,

144 Idaho

at

736, 170 P.3d at 401.

A sentence is reasonable “‘if

it

appears

necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.”

P.3d

at

1236-37 (quoting State

The
Tr., p. 22, L.

district court

18

would commit a

— p.

V.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

The

district court ﬁrst

its

161 Idaho at 895-96, 392

exercise 0f discretion. (12/10/19

found there was not an “undue risk” Cruz

similar crime again. (12/10/19 Tr., p. 22, L. 23

— p.

23, L. 2.)

The

noted that Cruz had completed treatment “during the pendency 0f this case, Which
(12/10/19 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 3-6.)

of

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).

applied the legal standards guiding

24, L. 11.)

m,

all

district court

is

t0 his credit.”

Cruz did not need personal deterrence because, the

district court

found, he

was

“truly remorseful” and, if taken “at his word,”

was “unlikely

to

d0

this again.”

(12/10/19 T12, p. 23, Ls. 12-18.)

However, “the Court’s primary consideration”
society.” (12/10/19 Tr., p. 22, Ls. 21-23.)

is

“the

good order and protection 0f

A lesser sentence, such as probation, would “depreciate

the seriousness 0fthe defendant’s crime.” (12/10/19 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 6-1

in

need 0f personal deterrence, the sentence imposed by the

appropriate deterrent for other persons in the community.”

Finally, although

Cruz was not a habitual offender,

his prior

1.)

Although Cruz was not

district court

“would provide an

(12/10/19 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 18-24.)

misdemeanor DUI and probation

—

this

DUI

a repeat offense.

concluded

that,

“because of the seriousness of these crimes” the sentence imposed was “necessary

made

for the

(12/10/19 Tr., p. 23, L. 25

good order and protection 0f society and

for

general deterrence.” (12/10/19 TL, p. 24, Ls. 7-21

The record supports

DUI and was on probation

p. 24, L. 6.)

it

district court

punishment 0f this defendant’s conduct and

.)

the district court’s exercise of discretion. Cruz

for

The

When he committed

the instant crime.

had committed a prior

(PSI, pp. 6-7, 14.)

Cruz

had not rehabilitated as a result ofthat conviction or probation—he did not commit to rehabilitation
until

he had killed a young

(PSI, pp. 4-6; R., p. 13.)

had

t0

woman and her unborn

Although the

child and severely injured a

district court

found several mitigating

factors, those factors

be balanced against the extreme harm Cruz had caused by his criminal

district court

properly based

its

Rather than address the
there are mitigating factors

its

Because the

sentence on mitigating factors but also the protection of the

community, the seriousness of the crime, and the
the district court did not abuse

acts.

factors

of punishment and general deterrence,

discretion.

district court’s analysis

and evidence

and balancing, Cruz merely points out

in his case. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-5.)

He

that

speciﬁcally

points out that he

was remorseful and a 10w

risk to reoffend,

and points

t0 evidence

he was in the

National Guard, had a good employment history, and had offered to pay child support.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-5. 1) However, the district court stated

in the record.

(12/10/19 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 16-21.)

history, service in the National Guard,

and offer

otherwise. Moreover, the district court found Cruz
22, L. 23

is

— p.

23, L. 2.)

It

was

It

t0

it

had read the sentencing materials

therefore aware 0f Cruz’s

pay child support.

was a 10W

Cruz does not claim

risk t0 reoffend.

found that Cruz was remorseful. (12/10/19

employment

(12/10/19 Tr., p.

Tr., p. 23, Ls. 12-18.)

pointing out evidence 0f the district court considered and mitigating facts

it

Cruz

actually found and

balanced.

What Cruz does
scale.

He

not address are the factors the district court put on the other side of the

does not challenge the

district court’s

determination that a lesser sentence would

depreciate the seriousness of the crime, or that the sentence

that the facts

of

this case

made some punishment

mitigating and aggravating factors

He

would

in order.

was reasonable, Cruz has

bolster general deterrence, or

Because the balancing 0f these

failed t0

show an abuse of discretion.

has failed to show that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to

accomplish the goals of sentencing.

Cruz also argues that he did not intend the harm he caused. (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) Had he
kill Otton and her unborn baby and badly injure her
he would
undoubtedly have been convicted and sentenced for a much more serious crime and for a much
longer term of incarceration. Lack 0f intent t0 kill 0r harm is merely part of his vehicular homicide
and aggravated DUI convictions—not a mitigating fact.
1

intended to

5

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment 0f the

district court.

DATED this 9th day of September, 2020.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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